http://hdl.handle.net/10027/7320 Sun, 19 May 2013 23:56:33 GMT 2013-05-19T23:56:33Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/8522 Closing and cloning in open-end mutual funds Chen, Hsiu-Lang; Gao, Sheldon; Hu, Xiaoqing Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings. NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Banking and Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Banking and Finance, [Vol 36, Issue 4, (April 2012)] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.11.010 Sun, 01 Apr 2012 05:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/8522 2012-04-01T05:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/7736 The Transportation Revolution and Antebellum Sectional Disagreement Binder, John J. The transportation revolution had several important effects on the antebellum political equilibrium. First, it caused western and southern political views to differ by bringing more easterners and European immigrants into the West. Second, it reduced the costs of rerouting western exports to the non-South, which decreased the expected costs to the West of conflict with the South. Third, it greatly increased western population, which brought more free states into the Union and changed the balance in the Senate. Fourth, it increased northern numerical superiority over the South, giving the North a major advantage if an armed conflict did occur. These changes led the West to ally with the East and caused the South to secede. This is a copy of an article published in Social Science History, © 2011 Duke University Press. The original version is available through Duke University Press at DOI: 10.1215/01455532-2010-016. Tue, 01 Mar 2011 06:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/7736 2011-03-01T06:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/7375 Are Financial Constraints Priced? Evidence from Firm Fundamentals and Stock Returns Campello, Murillo; Chen, Long Using comprehensive firm- and aggregate-level data, this paper studies the real and financial implications of capital market imperfections. We first examine whether financially constrained firms' business fundamentals (capital spending and operating earnings) are more sensitive to macroeconomic movements than unconstrained firms' fundamentals. We then examine whether financial constraint "return factors" respond to macroeconomic shocks in tandem with the responses from business fundamentals. The evidence in this paper points to financial constraints affecting both fundamental quantities and asset returns. The definitive version is available at DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00326.x Wed, 01 Sep 2010 05:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/7375 2010-09-01T05:00:00Z