http://hdl.handle.net/10027/1238 Thu, 20 Jun 2013 01:13:59 GMT 2013-06-20T01:13:59Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9796 Locke on Substance, Mode, and Personal Identity In my dissertation I examine how John Locke’s conceptions of “substance” and “mode” inform his theory of personal identity. My goal is to get a better understanding of what Locke’s picture of persons looks like, and where Locke lies within the larger debate over personal identity. I start with the persistence conditions Locke gives for persons. In Book II, Ch. XXVII of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke famously claims that sameness of substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the identity of a person over time. Many commentators have contended that there is a tension between this claim and Locke’s definition of “person.” They argue that the latter makes it look like persons are substances, but the former makes it look like this can’t be the case. This has caused some commentators to argue that Locke thinks persons are modes. This has caused others to claim that Locke thinks persons are substances, but Locke means something different by “substance” when he gives the persistence conditions for persons than when he deems an entity a substance. Although substance readings of Locke on persons were quite popular for some time, mode readings have gained considerable traction as of late. I argue that we must get a firm grasp on what Locke means by “substance” and “mode” to come to a conclusion on the matter. After giving a thorough treatment of Locke on substance and mode, I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that there is compelling evidence that Locke thinks persons are substances. This becomes clear if we examine Locke’s definition of “person” in light of what Locke says about substance, power and agency in other parts of the Essay. Moreover, I argue that when we place Locke’s claims about sameness of substance in their proper context and see what he means by them, it becomes clear that there is no tension between Locke’s definition of “person” and the persistence conditions Locke gives for persons. Most importantly, we don’t have to attribute to Locke a conception of “substance” he doesn’t have in order to get this result. This is not to say that I think Locke’s picture of persons is without problems. It’s just that a tension between Locke’s definition of “person” and the persistence conditions Locke gives for persons is not one of them. Thu, 21 Feb 2013 06:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9796 2013-02-21T06:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9545 Investigating the Universe: Quine, New Foundations, and the Philosophy of Set Theory Investigating the Universe Quine, New Foundations, and the Philosophy of Set Theory Sean P. Morris, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, Illinois (2012) Dissertation Chairperson: W. D. Hart Since the late1960’s, there has been widespread agreement among both philosophers and mathematicians that the only conception of a set is that of the iterative conception as embodied by Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory and its related systems. In contrast, W.V. Quine’s set theory with a universal set, New Foundations (NF), has been widely neglected if not outright dismissed as a going option for a theory of sets. I argue that there are no grounds for such dismissals and that many of the reasons offered in favor of ZF can also be offered for NF, and that these reasons are largely pragmatic in justification. From this I draw two main conclusions. The first, a historical point about Quine, is that much of his naturalistic and broadly pragmatic outlook, as exemplified in his major philosophical work Word and Object, emerged from his early engagement with Russell’s foundational work in mathematics. As such, we can see Quine’s philosophical work as intimately intertwined with his early technical endeavors. The second, a more general philosophical claim, is that mathematics in its foundations develops in ways much more akin to the natural sciences and as such is not the paradigm of a priori knowledge philosophers have often thought it to be. Thu, 13 Dec 2012 06:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9545 2012-12-13T06:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9198 Civic Friendship, Justice, and Political Stability Philosophers have extensively considered how principles of justice shape institutions and policies, yet they have neglected to examine the extent to which conceptions of justice are also reflected in the political relationship between citizens. Civic friendship, the relationship between members of a political community, both shapes the prevailing conception of justice, and is shaped by that conception. It further evokes the value of community and social solidarity. Consequently, civic friendship provides as useful as a way framework for understanding discussions of political stability. Institutions and policies also have consequences for the civic relationship. So described, the civic relationship seems to be a product the principles of justice as embodied in a particular institutional context. Yet, we can also regard civic friendship as developing in interaction with the conception of justice. We need not, in other words, treat fraternity as unconnected with liberty and equality. When we treat justice as a kind of relationship among citizens, then we can better consider what sorts of policies and duties are appropriate to that relationship. Rather than attempting to derive all the content of justice from abstract principles, we can then use those principles in conjunction with a concordant view of civic relationships, both of which are grounded in the conception of justice. Rawls’s claim that justice is a fair system of social cooperation among free and equal members of society is as much a statement about the relationship between citizens as it is a way to determine principles of justice. Such an approach, I argue, provides a more complete and more natural grounding for the duties of citizenship. Moreover, it helps to clarify the connection between political ideals and the actual relationships of citizens. Mon, 10 Dec 2012 06:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/9198 2012-12-10T06:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10027/8931 Modal Knowledge, in Theory We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. I articulate an account of that justification. On my view, we are justified in believing a modal claim only if we are justified in believing a theory according to which that claim is true. Defending this requires (1) an account of theories on which they have modal content and (2) an account of how we can be justified in believing that theories are true. I use the semantic view of theories to satisfy the former requirement and inference to the best explanation (IBE) to satisfy the latter. Since IBE has been roundly criticized, I devote considerable attention to its defense. I also explore a number of potential defeaters to our having justified modal beliefs, including the modal analogue of Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Ultimately, though, I show that my leads to the view that the scope of our modal knowledge is modest, and I argue that modal modal epistemologies that are more optimistic are implausible on that basis. Fri, 07 Dec 2012 06:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10027/8931 2012-12-07T06:00:00Z